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I. INTRODUCTION
In May of 1993, the National Basketball Association (NBA)
announced an unprecedented television contract in hopes of rais-
ing the league's national television ratings. The new four year $750
million dollar contract with NBC has the potential to abolish
superstation coverage of NBA games,1 which, while economically
beneficial for the league, could drastically limit the number of bas-
ketball games shown across the nation in both NBA local markets
(cities having NBA teams) and markets where no local team exists.
A superstation is an independent television station that broad-
casts in its local market area, and whose broadcast signal is picked
up around the country by local cable companies for broadcast in
their particular area.2 From the 1986-87 basketball season through
the 1991 season, the NBA's superstation rules permitted each team
to broadcast up to forty-one of its games (home or away) per sea-
l. Thomas Tyrer, NBA, NBC Deal Limits Cable Games, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, May 10,
1993, at 3.
2. Chicago Pro. Sports Ltd. Partnership v. Nat'l. Basketball Ass'n., 754 F. Supp. 1336,
1338 (N.D.I11. 1991) [hereinafter Chicago Pro. Sports].
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son, of which twenty-five could be broadcast over superstations s
In 1990, however, the NBA's Board of Governors, consisting of one
representative from each of the twenty-seven teams, decided to re-
duce the number of superstation telecasts to twenty.' The owner of
the Chicago Bulls, Chicago Professional Sports Limited Partner-
ship (Chicago Pro. Sports), and WGN Continental Broadcasting
Company (WGN), the superstation that contracted with the Bulls
to carry its basketball games, brought suit against the NBA seek-
ing to enjoin enforcement of the five game reduction claiming that
it "constitute[d] both an unlawful horizontal agreement among the
teams to restrict output and a group boycott of superstations, in
violation of Section One of the Sherman Act [15 U.S.C. § 1].",
In a bench trial, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois (Judge Will presiding) found for the
plaintiffs and entered an injunction preventing the NBA from en-
forcing the twenty game limit.6 Rejecting the NBA's argument that
the Sports Broadcasting Act 7 exempted the sports league from the
Sherman Act8 , Judge Will held that under the Rule of Reason,
none of the NBA's arguments for the reduction justified a restraint
of trade that limited output.' On appeal, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit" affirmed the District Court,
holding that (1) while the lower court was correct in ruling that the
Sports Broadcasting Act does not protect the five game reduction,
some of its reasoning was erroneous," and (2) under NCAA v.
Board of Regents of the Univ. of Oklahoma,2 the District Court
did not commit clear error in holding that the contract violated the
Rule of Reason.13 Circuit Court Judge Easterbrook, however,
hinted in dictum that the league could have employed other legiti-
mate means to control superstations.1 4 These decisions resulted in
the courts inviting the NBA to rewrite its contracts to control out-
put legally, thereby ensuring the exclusivity of the national televi-
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1349.
6. Id. at 1339.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1992).
8. Chicago Pro. Sports, 754 F. Supp. at 1350.
9.. Id. at 1358.
10. Chicago Pro. Sports Ltd. Partnership v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n., 961 F.2d 667 (7th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct 409 (1992) [hereinafter Chicago Pro. Sports II].
11. Id. at 671.
12. 468 U.S. 85 (1984) [hereinafter Board of Regents].
13. Chicago Pro. Sports H, 961 F.2d at 676.
14. Id. at 671.
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sion contracts. The new contract, which aims to improve the
league's national television ratings and boost advertising revenues,
appears to follow the narrow language of the Sports Broadcasting
Act, a move that both courts suggested could defeat an antitrust
attack.
This comment examines the decisions in Chicago Pro. Sports
v. NBA and analyzes the underlying tension between the sports
fan's desire for maximum output (the number of games broadcast),
and the sports business's desire to protect the broadcasting rights
and revenues of the local market (the exclusive right to broadcast
the local team's game or any game). The outcome of this case has a
serious economic impact on individual basketball teams' local tele-
vision markets. Because the courts refused to find that supersta-
tions harm either local or national basketball broadcasts (due to
the fact that the NBA failed to produce any credible evidence to
this effect), the NBA rewrote its new national television contract
using the road map laid out by the court, following the narrow re-
quirements of the Sports Broadcasting Act. If successful, the new
contract will undoubtedly result in decreased output of televised
NBA games across the nation and unfairly affect those fans with-
out local professional teams. For example, superstations allow
baseball and basketball fans in Billings, Montana, a town without
a major league team in any sport, to enjoy nightly professional
sports entertainment. Without the luxury of superstations, these
fans would either have to wait for a weekend network game or
purchase the right to watch a game on pay-per-view. 5
Accordingly, Congress should amend the copyright laws or the
Sports Broadcasting Act to deal more equitably with the problems
facing both the local markets, which suffer from unfair intrusions
by superstations, and basketball fans, who lose out because of de-
creased output. Modernizing the Sports Broadcasting Act, by al-
lowing a professional sports league to place output restrictions
upon superstation telecasts of that sport, would allow the NBA to
legally control the number of superstation broadcasts of NBA
games. This method, however, would only decrease the number of
games shown on superstations. Moreover, it might not ensure an
increase in local broadcasts nor guarantee that local markets would
retain the exclusive rights to broadcast their local team's games.18
15. Fans are also able to watch NBA games on Turner Network Television (TNT), or
regional sports channels, neither of which are pay-per-view, but do require that the fan
subscribe to cable.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 157-159.
1993]
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A better result can be reached with a change in the Copyright
Act of 1976." The Act currently allows local cable companies to
legally carry copyrighted superstation broadcasts without permis-
sion of the superstation, "so long as the cable company contributes
a [statutorily fixed] royalty fee" to the Copyright Office. 18 Amend-
ing the Copyright Act of 1976 to provide that no cable operator
may retransmit a superstation professional sports broadcast if that
event is otherwise available on that same local cable system would
ensure a restoration of fair market value to local telecast rights and
eliminate redundant broadcasts of sporting events by superstations
in local cable areas at below market rates.19
II. SUPERSTATIONS AND THEIR EFFECTS
Currently, three major superstations operate in the United
States, all of which broadcast NBA games. 20 These include WTBS
in Atlanta, WGN in Chicago, and WWOR in New York.2 Super-
stations came into existence shortly after the enactment of Section
111 of the Copyright Act of 1976.22 Section 111 permits local cable
companies to "retransmit copyrighted programming from any
over-the-air stations across the country to their subscribers under
a 'compulsory license.' "23 Under the compulsory licensing pro-
gram, local cable systems pay a fee into the Copyright Office
(which holds the money in a fund); this payment entitles these
cable systems to retransmit certain copyrighted programs to their
subscribers.24 The fees are then distributed to the eligible copy-
right owners pursuant to decisions of the Copyright Royalty
Tribunal.25
Communications carriers2" act as conduits between the super-
17. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1992).
18. Chicago Pro. Sports, 754 F. Supp. at 1346.
19. See infra text accompnying notes 160-175.
20. There are many more smaller superstations operating in the United States; how-
ever, they do not broadcast NBA games nationally.
21. Chicago Pro. Sports, 754 F. Supp. at 1345-46.
22. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1992).
23. Chicago Pro. Sports, 754 F. Supp. at 1346. See also 17 U.S.C. § 111(c)-(d) (1992)
(discussing the requirements and applicability of the compulsory license).
24. Hubbard Broadcasting v. Southern Satellite, 777 F.2d 393, 395 (8th Cir.
1985)[hereinafter Hubbard Broadcasting]. See also 17 U.S.C. § 111(c)-(d) (1992) (the act
places certain restrictions upon local cable systems for retransmission. For example § 111
(c)(2)(A) restricts retransmissions that are contrary to FCC rules; § 111 (c)(2)(B) restricts
systems that fail to pay their fees to the royalty fund).
25. Hubbard Broadcasting, 777 F.2d at 395.
26. Communication carriers "retransmit secondarily the 'primary transmission' of a
licensed television broadcast station .. .to cable systems." Id. at 396.
[Vol. 11:173
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stations and the local cable systems."' According to § 111(a)(3) of
the Copyright Act, communications carriers may not exercise any
"direct or indirect control over the content or selection of the pri-
mary transmission or over the particular recipients of the second-
ary transmission . ".2.."8 If the communications carrier exerts any
control over programming, the carrier will incur copyright liabil-
ity.29 In other words, communications carriers merely transmit
what is broadcast by the superstation to the local cable company;
they have no independent decision-making power over
programming.
A specific example of how superstations operate is helpful.
WGN in Chicago became a superstation in 1978.30 United Video,
WGN's carrier, retransmits WGN's signal to local cable companies,
who then pay a semi-annual fee into the Copyright Office.-" The
Copyright Office eventually distributes this fee back to copyright
owners in the form of royalty payments for their copyrighted pro-
grams. 32 While the carrier may pick up the signal off-the-air,
United Video has received its transmissions from WGN since 1985
in the form of a "direct microwave link-up," which allows United
to retransmit WGN's signal from a microwave feed sent directly by
the station.3"
The use of a microwave feed permits WGN to split its signal,
enabling it to broadcast one signal over the air to its Chicago audi-
ence, while at the same time televising a different signal using the
microwave. " This allows the station to increase its advertising rev-
enues by charging one rate for advertising locally, and a higher rate
for national advertisers because the local-only signal is not seen
nationally.3 5 The microwave also allows for two separate programs,
as well as advertising, to be broadcast simultaneously to WGN's
different audiences.38
27. Id.
28. 17 U.S.C. § 111(a)(3) (1992).
29. Hubbard Broadcasting, 777 F.2d at 396.
30. Chicago Pro. Sports, 754 F. Supp. at 1346.
31. Id.
32. Id. The cable operators also pay a fee to receive the satellite transmission from the
carrier.
33. Id. at 1346. See also Hubbard Broadcasting, 777 F.2d at 397-98 (for advantages of
a direct microwave link-up such as better reception and automatic shifts from the micro-
wave to over-the-air if one signal is impaired).
34. Chicago Pro. Sports, 754 F. Supp. at 1346.
35. Id. at 1346. In other words, a national advertiser which refused to pay national
rates would find that his commercials would be limited to the Chicago audience.
36. Id.
1993]
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In 1990, the Federal Communications Commission enacted
regulations giving "local broadcast stations the right to purchase
exclusive rights to syndicated programming and forbid cable oper-
ators from importing the same programming into their broadcast
markets." ' According to the Syndex rules, dealing with this syndi-
cated programming,"8 superstations are now obligated to "cover-
over," or blackout, certain syndicated programs to which a local
television station has exclusive rights in its market, and substitute
different programming.3 9 The Syndex rules, however, cover only
syndicated programs such as Cheers or Murphy Brown, not sports
programs.40 Although it is possible to split its feed during Chicago
Bulls' broadcasts, WGN chooses not to do so, legally televising the
game and commercials locally and providing the same feed to the
carrier for national distribution at the same time."
The problem the NBA has encountered with the superstations
is prevalent everywhere in professional sports today.'" Because the
Syndex Rules do not protect against games of one sports league
competing against games in the same league, superstations allow
teams such as the Chicago Bulls, Cubs and White Sox, and the
Atlanta Hawks and Braves to receive national coverage of their
games which would not ordinarily be available to them absent
WGN or WTBS. This national exposure, in turn, harms non-super-
station teams and their local markets when attempting to negoti-
ate for exclusive broadcast rights contracts.' 3 Advertisers recognize
that superstation broadcasts of sporting events detract from the
exclusivity of the local market broadcast and can negotiate adver-
tising prices accordingly." The inevitable result is that local broad-
37. Id. at 1347.
38. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.151-76.163 (1992). Syndicated programming is any television pro-
gram sold to television licensees in more than one market across the United States, other
than current network programming. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.5(ii).
39. Chicago Pro. Sports, 754 F. Supp. at 1347.
40. Id. For instance, if a local television station bought the exclusive rights to broad-
cast Cheers at 7:30 pm into its own broadcast area, the Syndex rules prevent a cable system
from importing Cheers into that local area over a superstation.
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., Terry Blount, Baseball's Burning Questions; Change in the Air as CBS,
ESPN Squirm, Hous. CHRON. Feb. 28, 1993, at Sports 2, 17 [hereinafter Blount, Baseball's
Burning Questions] (reporting that baseball's once popular "Game of the Week" is now just
another game due to oversaturation of superstation games in the market); See also Gene
Wojociechowski, Q & A with Pete Rozelle, L.A. TimEs, Jan. 24, 1993, at Cl (where the
former NFL Commissioner predicts that football's number one priority in the future is con-
trolling the entrance of superstations into the league).
43. See Bob Dart, Vincent: End Superstation's Baseball, THE ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
Apr. 30, 1992, at F5 [hereinafter Dart, Vincent].
44. Id.
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casters "end up competing for viewers with games on the
superstations."' 5
The oversaturation of superstation games on television have
major economic effects on local markets' broadcasts of local profes-
sional sports teams. Although no studies have been conducted
showing the local market effect of NBA superstation telecasts,
studies conducted in other professional sports show a severe drop-
off in viewership on nights that superstations broadcast a game or
the same game as the local market.4' The effect has been so great
in some areas that local markets no longer can afford to broadcast
the local professional team.47
III. THE NBA BROADCAST STRATEGY AND THE BULLs/WGN
CONTRACT
In 1990, the NBA sold its broadcast rights to both the Na-
tional Broadcast Company (NBC) and to Turner Network Televi-
sion (TNT), a cable network."' Revenues from the national televi-
sion contracts were estimated to be worth up to $6.8 million per
team in 1991. "1 According to the NBA, the main reason for its re-
surgence in popularity and economic prosperity from the early
1980's "has been a sound and consistent television policy. 50 A ma-
jor part of this television policy has been to restrict the number of
local and superstation telecasts any one team may sell in order to
boost ratings for network games shown nationally. 1
Under the NBA's 1991 television policy, each team could broa-
45. Id.
46. See infra text accompanying notes 132-137.
47. See id.
48. Chicago Pro. Sports, 754 F. Supp. at 1340.
49. Id. The NBA contends that without the money generated from the national televi-
sion contracts, many teams would operate at a loss for the season. Id.
50. Id. at 1342. For example, in 1981 and 1982, league revenues for both cable and
over-the-air television were only $23 million, and the 1981 the championship series was
shown not on live network programming, but on tape delay. Id. By contrast, in 1991, the
league grossed over $180 million from its television contracts with NBC and TNT. Id.
One could argue that the real reason for the league's resurgence both in terms of eco-
nomics and popularity was the emergence of basketball stars such as Magic Johnson, Larry
Bird and Michael Jordan in the early 1980's. Combine these superstars' grip on the public
with Commissioner David Stern's marketing expertise and the league's resurgence was
assured.
51. Id. For instance, in 1980 the Board of Governors of the NBA adopted a resolution
limiting each team to 41 telecasts, not including national broadcasts. Id. In 1985, the Board
placed further restrictions on superstations, this time limiting the amount of telecasts any
one team may sell to a superstation to 25 games. Id. at 1343. The Chicago Bulls supported
both resolutions adopted by the Board. Id.
19931
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cast up to forty-one games, whether they be home or away. The
revenues from these broadcasts were the property of the team and
did not have to be shared with the NBA or the other teams.2 The
major restriction upon the teams, however, was that they could not
broadcast any games on local television, cable or superstations at
the same time NBC was televising a game, although "teams [could]
telecast... the same game TNT [was] carrying, head-to-head with
TNT, on strictly local over-the-air TV or on local cable. '53
The 1989 television contract between the Bulls and WGN,
when negotiated, followed the NBA broadcast policy prior to the
twenty game rule. The contract permitted the station to broadcast
twenty-five games for both the 1989-90 and 1990-91 seasons, with
options to extend the agreement through the 1993-94 season.5 " The
contract was set for only twenty-five games (although WGN
wanted more) in accordance with the NBA's broadcasting policy,
and was also made subject to any future television regulations the
NBA might pass.55 Additionally, the contract contained a
walkaway provision: "In the event that league rules, during the
term of the contract, are amended to bar the Bulls from giving
WGN at least 21 games, 'due to [WGN's] status as a superstation,'
either party has the option of terminating the agreement,
unilaterally."5 6
Following the 1990 agreements with NBC and TNT, the
NBA's Board of Governors, over the dissent of the Bulls and the
New Jersey Nets,57 voted to reduce the number of games each
team may broadcast on superstations from twenty-five to twenty.5 8
Chicago Professional Sports Limited Partnership and WGN Conti-
nental Broadcasting Company then filed the antitrust suit in fed-
52. Id. at 1344. Teams may also show games within an "extended market," or cable-
casts beyond the 75 mile radius of the home team's city, but not beyond 75 miles of this
radius. Id. Revenues from these broadcasts must be shared with the league. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1347.
55. Id. at 1347-48. As a result of the District Court decision in this case, WGN actually
broadcast 30 Bulls games in the 1991-1992 season. Chicago Pro. Sports 11, 961 F.2d 669 (7th
Cir. 1992). Judge Will has said that he will rule on the Bulls bid to show up to forty-one
games on WGN in the fall of 1993. See Steve Nidetz, CBS' Surprise Bid Stirs Up Einhorn,
CHI. TRIB., May 17, 1993, at C13 [hereinafter Nidetz, CBS' Surprise]. As of publication of
this article in the Spring of 1994, the District Court had not rendered a decision on the right
to show forty-one games.
56. Chicago Pro. Sports, 754 F. Supp. at 1348.
57. The Nets contracted with WWOR in New York to cover six of their games. Id. at
1349. Ironically, since the Nets broadcast only six games over WWOR, the rule would not
have affected the team.
58. Id. at 1343.
[Vol. 11:173
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eral court seeking to enjoin the twenty game rule. The Bulls and
WGN alleged that the NBA's five game reduction "constitute[d]
both an unlawful horizontal agreement among the teams to restrict
output and a group boycott of superstations, in violation of Section
1 of the Sherman Act [15 U.S.C. § 1]." 5
IV. THE SPORTS BROADCASTING ACT
The NBA responded first and foremost that its contract was
exempt from the antitrust laws under the Sports Broadcasting Act
of 1961 (SBA), 0 and therefore its move to reduce five superstation
broadcasts could not be attacked under the Sherman Act. 1 The
SBA provides:
The antitrust laws... shall not apply to any joint agreement by
or among persons engaging in or conducting the organized pro-
fessional team sport of... basketball... by which any league of
clubs . . . sells or otherwise transfers all or any part of the rights
of such league's member clubs in the sponsored telecasting of
the games . . . engaged in or conducted by such clubs.2
The SBA was passed by Congress at the request of the Na-
tional Football League (NFL) after a District Court in Pennsylva-
nia in 1953 first invalidated, as an illegal restraint under the Sher-
man Act, an NFL by-law on broadcasting rights, and then in 1961
voided a television contract between the NFL and the Columbia
Broadcast Company (CBS) on similar grounds. In both cases the
league, and not the individual teams, transferred its broadcast
rights. "The immediate effect of the SBA was to establish that the
CBS contract was lawful and to overrule the 1961 decision."64 In
other words, the SBA was a grant of power to the sports leagues
allowing them to circumvent the antitrust laws if the leagues fol-
lowed the narrow requirements of the Act.
The District Court rejected the NBA's argument that it fell
within the narrow terms of the SBA. According to the Court, the
SBA protects only transfers of broadcast rights by a league as a
59. Chicago Pro. Sports, 754 F. Supp. at 1349.
60. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-1295 (1992).
61. Chicago Pro. Sports, 754 F. Supp. at 1349.
62. 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1992).
63. See United States v. National Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953);
United States v. National Football League, 196 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Pa. 1961) (holding the
CBS contract invalid because the network had full power to decide which games it would
telecast and where they would be televised).
64. Chicago Pro. Sports, 754 F. Supp. at 1351.
1993]
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whole, and not transfers made by the individual teams.e5 In the
WGN contract, the Bulls, not the NBA, possessed the licensing
power to transfer the broadcast rights.8 6 Therefore, the transaction
could not fall under the literal terms of the SBA because the trans-
fer of broadcast rights was not a transfer by a league, but rather a
transfer by a team participating in a league."
The NBA also contended that if the SBA covered the NBC
contract, then it should also protect the twenty game restraint pro-
posed to protect the "exclusivity" of that contract.6 The Court
found this theory unpersuasive. Looking to the SBA's original pur-
pose," the District Court stated that "[i]f the NBA were to trans-
fer rights in all of its games and guarantee that all of them would
be televised, which is what the NFL did in 1961 and continues to
do today, the transfer would be protected by the SBA and immune
from antitrust attack .... ,,70 As this was not done, any limitations
placed upon the games not covered by the NBC contract would not
be protected by the SBA. 1
The Court went on to say that the SBA only protected trans-
fers by a league, not the prohibitions of transfers by a league, as
the NBA argued.s The Court held that the SBA should be read
narrowly, and any "arguments that the SBA should have been
65. Id. at 1350.
66. See supra text accompanying notes 52-56.
67. Chicago Pro. Sports, 754 F. Supp. at 1350. The NBA also raised a number of argu-
ments to counter the literal effect of the statute. For instance, the NBA argued that the
broadcasting rights sold to WGN were really transferred by the league rather than the Bulls.
Id. The Court responded that the NBA never owned the rights to the twenty-five games
transferred to WGN; the Bulls were the true owners. The superstation simply paid the Bulls
for the rights to show the games, with the NBA receiving only a small portion of the fees
distributed by the Copyright Royalty Tribunal. Id. Furthermore, the Court held that the
NBA possessed little authority to block a transfer of games by the individual teams. Id. The
twenty-seven teams in the NBA agreed among themselves to contract in accordance to the
league's by-laws and constitution. Id. However, nowhere in that agreement, nor in the con-
stitution or by-laws for that matter, was it required that the teams share their separately
owned broadcast rights with the league. Id.
According to the terms of the 1991 NBC contract, NBA teams would lose their licensing
rights to telecast any of the twenty-two games NBC planned to carry nationally in 1991. Id.
In other words, the teams had "ceded their rights in those games to the league, and the
league, as owner of the rights to those games, licensed them to NBC." Id. (emphasis in
original). The SBA, therefore, only protected those games transferred to NBC. Any games
not sold to NBC by the NBA remained the property of the individual teams.
68. Id. at 1351.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64. A review. of the legislative history
reveals little public purpose behind the SBA.
70. Chicago Pro. Sports, 754 F. Supp. at 1351.
71. Id. at 1351-1352.
72. Id. at 1352.
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written more broadly should be addressed to the Congress not the
federal courts. 7 3
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit disagreed with part of Judge
Will's reasoning. It held that the SBA might protect prohibitions
of transfers by a league. Stating that it was the Court's duty to
read exceptions to the antitrust laws "narrowly, with beady eyes
and green eyeshades, ' '7' Judge Easterbrook wrote that the Sports
Broadcasting Act must restrict output to have any antitrust effect
at all.5 "The statute allows the transfer of 'all or any part of' the
rights in games; 'part of' implies fewer than all."'7 6 Contrary to
what the District Court suggested, the SBA would have no relevant
antitrust application if a sports league could not keep some of its
games off the air." Even the National Football League, the sports
league with the most extensive broadcasting program, bars broad-
casts of some of its games.78
In the end, however, the Seventh Circuit came to the same
conclusion as the District Judge - that the SBA was limited only
to those games that NBC and TNT contracted to show and none
other:
[T]he Sports Broadcasting Act applies only when the league has
"transferred" a right to "sponsored telecasting." Neither the
NBA's contract with NBC nor its contract with Turner Network
Television transfers to the network a right to limit the broad-
casting of other contests. Both contract and ... the league's arti-
cles and bylaws, reserve to the individual clubs the full copy-
right interests in all games that the league has not sold to the
networks. As the "league of clubs" has not transferred to the
networks either the right to show, or the right to black out, any
additional games, the Sports Broadcasting Act does not protect
its 20-game rule.7 9
73. Id.
74. Chicago Pro. Sports H, 961 F.2d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct.
409 (1992). It appears that Judge Easterbrook traditionally interprets special interest legis-
lation, like the SBA, extremely narrowly. See Stephen F. Ross, An Antitrust Analysis of
Sports League Contracts With Cable Networks, EMORY L.J. 463, 470 n. 29 (1990).
75. Id. at 670. Easterbrook characterizes the SBA as special interest legislation or "a
single industry exception to a law designed for the protection of the public." Chicago Pro.
Sports H, 961 F.2d at 671. See also Frank Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term -
Forward: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARv. L. REV. 4, 15 (1984).
76. Id. at 670.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Chicago Pro. Sports II, 961 F.2d at 671. The Seventh Circuit never defined the
phrase "sponsored telecasting." According to Professor Stephen F. Ross at University of
Illinois Law School, the SBA applies only to the contracts with NBC, because the act's
1993]
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Under the Seventh Circuit's reading of the SBA, any transfer
made by the league is sheltered from antitrust scrutiny. This sent
a clear message to the NBA to restructure its national network
contract. If the league transferred all broadcasting rights over to
NBC, both the network and the league could legally restrict super-
station broadcasts of NBA games."
V. ANTITRUST ANALYSIS
A. The District Court
Because both Courts found that the SBA did not apply, the
plaintiff's antitrust claims had to then be assessed. The District
Court began its antitrust analysis by noting that, by its terms, the
five game reduction represented a significant restraint on trade.
The Court labelled the proposed rule as a "horizontal agreement
among competitors to divide markets and control output, with the
stated purpose of raising prices." 81 Judge Will noted that, under
legislative history suggests that sponsored telecasting means "free, over-the-air telecasts."
Gene Kimmelman and Stephen F. Ross, Brief for Consumer Federation of America As Ami-
cus Curiae at 5, Chicago Pro. Sports II, 961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Amicus
Brief].
As Ross points out, because the NFL was the principal interest group and sponsor for
the SBA, former NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle's comments during hearings on the SBA
are helpful:
... Rozelle unequivocally conceded that the legislation was not intended to ap-
ply to games shown on pay or cable television. During hearings before the House
Antitrust Subcommittee, the committee's counsel directly asked whether Com-
missioner Rozelle ... understood "that this bill covers only the free telecasting
of professional sports contests, and does not cover pay T.V.." The Commissioner
responded, "Absolutely."
Telecasting of Professional Sports Contests: Hearings on H.R. 8757 Before the Subcomm.
on Antitrust (Subcomm. No. 5) of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess
36 (1961). See also Stephen F. Ross, An Antitrust Analysis of Sports League Contracts
With Cable Networks, 39 EMORY L.J. 463, 470 (1990) (discussing the above quoted
language).
But see Philip R. Hochberg, The Case of the Lost Exemption, SPORTS INC., May 2, 1988
at 38 (arguing that because the definition of "sponsored telecasting" has never been defined
by Congress, the term's meaning is unclear and could technically invalidate the existing
television contract between the NFL and the cable network ESPN). Hochberg points out
that even the Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission are not in agreement on
the matter. Id.
80. See infra text accompanying notes 138-151 for details on the NBA's new network
contracts with NBC and TNT.
81. Chicago Pro. Sports, 754 F. Supp. at 1355. The court went on to say:
By confining teams to broadcast no more than 20 games, the agreement places
an artificial limit on supply and reduces it below the level which would prevail in
a market where the teams and the league were competing in the national market
and each team was free to match demand with supply.
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the agreement, ten fewer games would be shown on national televi-
sion in 1991, five less on WGN and five less on WTBS, a reduction
of output in the national market that by itself could trigger anti-
trust concerns.8 2
The District Court found that restraints employed by the
NBA (in the form of limiting superstation broadcasts) could be
justified as long as the league could show that the five game reduc-
tion possessed pro-competitive aspects."3 However, this was not a
normal Rule of Reason analysis."4 Because Judge Will found that
82. Id. at 1355-56. Moreover, the District Court viewed the NBA's policy as a form of
group boycott. Id. at 1350. See Keifer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S.
211 (1951) (holding that the Sherman Act makes it illegal for competing businesses to agree
among themselves to stop selling to particular customers and to fix maximum resale prices).
The NBA argued that the reduction was aimed at the superstations, and since supersta-
tions are not considered competitors with the league or the teams, the rule could not be
viewed as a boycott. Chicago Pro. Sports, 754 F. Supp. at 1356. The Court rejected this
argument stating that boycotts apply whether aimed at customers (the NBA's characteriza-
tion of superstations) or competitors. Id.
83. Id. at 1357-58. Although the District Court saw the five game reduction as a "sig-
nificant restraint on trade," it declined the Bulls' and WGN's request to declare the NBA's
proposal as illegal per se. "Per se rules are invoked when surrounding circumstances make
the likelihood of anti-competitive conduct so great as to render unjustified further examina-
tion of the challenged conduct." Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 103-04. See generally North-
west Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985);
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979). United
States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S.
350 (1967).
Judge Will stated that not every horizontal agreement that eliminated some competi-
tion was automatically illegal. Chicago Pro. Sports, 754 F. Supp. at 1357. Rather, in the
wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Board of Regents, the NBA's twenty game rule
could not be deemed illegal per se, and should be examined under the Rule of Reason. Id.
Where the competitive impact of the restraint "is not immediately obvious" and could be
capable of "enhancing competition rather than suppressing it," the Rule of Reason applies.
Id.
In other words, the twenty game rule on its face simply denied fans maximum access to
sports events. Thus, under a per se analysis, the restraint would be declared illegal with no
further examination. The Court, however, allowed the NBA the opportunity to prove that
the reduction possessed legitimate competitive objectives, such as the protection of local
markets. Unfortunately for the NBA, the league never took full advantage of this
opportunity.
84. "If a particular restraint under attack is arguably 'ancillary' to a lawful purpose,
and seems capable of enhancing competition rather than suppressing it, then the Rule of
Reason applies." Chicago Pro. Sports, 754 F. Supp at 1357 (citations omitted). In the pre-
sent case, the District Court could not say with certainty that the five game reduction was a
"naked restraint" with "no purpose except of stifling competition." Id. at 1358. Accordingly,
the court would examine the restraint to find if any redeeming, pro-competitive values ex-
isted. Id.
Under a normal Rule of Reason analysis, the burden of proof initially lies with the
plaintiff to show that the activity causes a significant restraint of trade. See Phillip Areeda,
The Rule of Reason - A Catechism on Competition, 55 ANTIRtUST L.J. 571 (1986) [hereinaf-
ter Areeda, Catechism]. Once the plaintiff has satisfactorily shown that a significant re-
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the challenged restraint clearly reduced output, the Court followed
Board of Regents,85 and employed a modified, or intermediate
Rule of Reason, placing the burden on the NBA to prove that the
five game reduction promoted, rather than restricted
competition. 6
The NBA argued that the five game reduction was necessary
to protect the team's local markets from superstation intrusions
and to protect the exclusivity of the NBC and TNT national tele-
vision contracts.8 7 Judge Will appeared to be sensitive to both ar-
guments stating, "The league's concern that superstations buy on
the cheap the same product that the national networks pay mil-
lions for, and through sales which currently generate no shared
revenues for the teams ... is understandable."8 8 Furthermore, the
District Court believed that a reduction of output for the protec-
tion of local markets was the NBA's strongest defense of the
twenty game rule. 9 For instance, the NBA argued that supersta-
tions, by encroaching into local NBA markets, hurt ratings and ad-
straint exists, the burden then shifts to the defendant to produce evidence justifying the
challenged restraint. See id. at 582. If the defendant shows that the restraint is justifiable,
the plaintiff must show that the intended goal of the challenged restraint could have been
achieved by a less restrictive alternative. Id. If successful, the defendant must then prove
that this alternative is not adequate or that it is not "substantially less restrictive." Id. In
other words, "[a]lthough the burden of coming forward may shift, the burden of persuasion
on these issues, one put into dispute, remains on the plaintiff." Id.
85. 468 U.S. 85 (1984). See infra text accompanying notes 102-113.
86. Chicago Pro. Sports, 754 F. Supp. at 1358. In other words, a restraint that is not
entirely naked (as the twenty game rule was here), "will be treated as naked unless the
defendant first persuades [the Court] that a legitimate objective is served. . . ." Areeda,
Catechism, supra note 84. The initial burden of proof is not with the plaintiff, as in a nor-
mal Rule of Reason analysis.
87. Id. at 1358-59. The NBA also argued that the five game reduction would allow
both the league and teams to make more money.The court rejected these arguments in prin-
ciple saying, "Maximizing revenues and 'protecting the value' of individual team and or
NBA contracts are not legitimate justifications by themselves for restraining trade by limit-
ing output." Id. at 1359. The Court went on to comment that the argument "[w]e do it
because it's more profitable" is not a defense under the Sherman Act. Id.
On appeal, the NBA would make a similar argument in that the five game reduction
precluded the teams from "misappropriating a property right that belongs to the NBA: the
right to exploit its symbols and success." Chicago Pro. Sports II, 961 F.2d at 674. The Sev-
enth Circuit rejected this reasoning because the argument interpreted the NBA's rules and
by-laws incorrectly in that the teams, and not the league, own the intellectual property to
their games. Id. Further, the NBA's attempt to dictate to teams which stations they could
contract with and for how many games, gave the NBA the appearance of a cartel, which
could not be used as a pro-competitive justification for a reduction in output. Id. According
to the Court, a "cartel could not insulate its agreement from the Sherman Act by giving
certain producers contractual rights to sell to specified customers." Id.
88. Chicago Pro. Sports, 754 F. Supp. at 1359.
89. Id.
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vertising for local NBA broadcasts. 90  The NBA, however,
presented no credible evidence to support these theories.91
Because the NBA produced no evidence supporting the local
market defense, the Court adopted WGN's argument that, con-
trary to what the NBA believed, up to half of WGN's viewing audi-
ence for any particular Bulls' game came from markets where no
home NBA team existed.2 Further, the Court did not believe that
a Bulls game on WGN had the ability to divert fans from watching
their own NBA team on nights these telecasts conflicted with
Bulls' telecasts.9 3 The NBA also failed to produce any evidence in-
dicating that the five game reduction was necessary to protect the
exclusivity of the NBC and TNT national contracts."" The Court
reasoned that both NBC and TNT had the opportunity, but de-
clined to include provisions in their contracts providing for a cap
on superstation broadcasts. 5 Further, the NBA produced no com-
petent evidence showing that superstation broadcasts lower na-
tional ratings for games shown by the networks.98 The Court even
went as far as calling NBA Commissioner David Stern's testimony
that fans who watch basketball games every night on superstations
were "less likely to watch the Sunday afternoon match-up on
NBC," as "almost sheer fantasy. '97
90. Id.
91. For instance, no representatives from any NBA teams or their local markets testi-
fied that superstations hurt local NBA ratings. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. The court used the Los Angeles Lakers as an example. One could argue, how-
ever, that given the fact that the Bulls have dominated the rest of the NBA from 1990 to
1993, many viewers would rather watch an exciting Bulls game than their own mediocre
team.
94. Id. at 1360.
95. Id. Both networks also could have shortened the duration of the national contracts
in order to study the effects superstations had on the national ratings structure. Id. The
resulting contracts with the two networks failed to even mention the superstations, which
tended to prove that superstations did not have the negative effects that the NBA main-
tained the stations had. Id.
96. Id. The only testimony supporting the NBA's theory came from the former Presi-
dent of NBC Sports, who opined that superstations were "of importance to NBC because
the more restrictive a product is to others, the more valuable it is to us now.., and from an
advertising standpoint." Id. No evidence was produced to support this statement, however.
97. Id. The Court stated:
WGN only televises Bulls games and only those Bulls games that NBC and TNT
have not selected for themselves. Likewise for WTBS' telecasts of the Hawks.
Consequently, a viewer who wants to watch the best games, rather than just
watch basketball, would tend to watch the games on NBC or TNT ... and
compulsive viewers will probably watch everything anyway. Thus, because NBC
and TNT are carrying the very best games, or trying to, they are less likely to be
losing viewers to the superstations than they otherwise might be ....
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Finally, the NBA failed to prove, by credible evidence, that,
"but for the superstations," NBC and TNT would have either
bought more games or paid more for the exclusive rights to broad-
cast NBA games.9 In fact, the Court found little evidence of price
negotiations at all between the networks and the NBA; "the NBA
put a figure on the table and NBC snapped it up."9 The Court
concluded that the NBA failed to meet its burden of showing that
the five game reduction promoted competition, rather than re-
stricting it.lo' Because the NBA failed to present any evidence that
the twenty game rule promoted competition, the District Court
found the reduction unlawful.'
B. The Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit could have affirmed the lower court with-
out resorting to its own reasoning by simply citing to Board of Re-
gents.0 12 In Board of Regents, the NCAA's television plan for the
1982-1985 seasons was at issue. The plan, restricted to the NCAA's
member institutions, was passed in order to combat the adverse
effects live television had on the home gate at NCAA football
Id. at 1361.
98. Id. at 1361.
99. Id. at 1362.
100. Id. As its final defense, the NBA argued that in any Rule of Reason analysis, the
Court must first assess market power. Chicago Pro. Sports II, 961 F.2d at 673. See also Polk
Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 191 (7th Cir. 1985). "Market power
is the ability to raise prices above those that would be charged in competitive market."
Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 109, n. 38 (citing Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v.
Hyde, 466 U.S. at 27, n. 46). "The purpose for defining a market is to help estimate market
shares, and the purpose for estimating market shares is to estimate the potential for adverse
effects." Chicago Pro. Sports, 754 F. Supp. at 1363.
The District Court rejected the NBA's argument, quoting from the Supreme Court case
of Board of Regents:
[Als a matter of law, the absence of proof of market power does not justify a
naked restriction on price or output ... and requires some competitive justifica-
tion even in the absence of a detailed market analysis .... We have never re-
quired proof of market power in such a case.
Id. at 1363 (citations omitted). See also Indiana Dentists, 476 U.S. at 85.
According to the Court, the NBA's twenty game rule fell into the same category as
Board of Regents and Indiana Dentists. Id. at 1363. In other words, as the negative effects
of the five game reduction were obvious, there was no need for an assessment of market
power. The Seventh Circuit would affirm the lower court's market power ruling, as it was
not clearly erroneous. See Chicago Pro. Sports I1, 961 F.2d at 674.
101. Chicago Pro. Sports, 754 F. Supp. at 1364.
102. 468 U.S. 85 (1984). It should be noted that Judge Easterbrook argued and lost in
front of the Supreme Court as chief counsel for the NCAA. This may be indicative of why
he wrote the opinion for the Court of Appeals.
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games. 03 The plan placed a limit on the number of college football
games in general that could be televised nationally per season, and
restricted the number of games any one college could televise in
any one season. 04
The plaintiffs/respondents in Board of Regents were members
of the College Football Association (CFA). 0 5 Because the power-
house conferences comprising the CFA believed they should have a
greater voice in formulating the television policy, 0 6 the CFA nego-
tiated an independent plan with NBC, allowing for both increased
television appearances and increased revenues for CFA member in-
stitutions.1 0 7 The NCAA responded by threatening "disciplinary
action against any CFA member that complied with the CFA-NBC
contract."' 0 8 In response to the NCAA's public threat, the CFA,
through the Universities of Oklahoma and Georgia, brought suit.
Distinguishing traditional illegal per se antitrust cases, 0 9 the
Supreme Court found that, although the NCAA's television plan
restrained trade, the case "involve[d] an industry in which hori-
zontal restraints on competition [were] essential if the product
[was] to be available at all." 0
The Court concluded that although the NCAA plan restrained
its member institutions' competition in both terms of price and
output, the restraints were not illegal per se, and a "fair evaluation
of their competitive character require[d] consideration of the
NCAA's justifications for the restraints.""' Thus, the Court ap-
103. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 91.
104. Id. at 94.
105. These were colleges and universities, who in addition to being member teams of
the NCAA, were also members of the CFA, and were concerned with promoting the "inter-
ests of major football-playing colleges within the NCAA structure." Id. at 85. The CFA con-
sists of five major football conferences, including the University of Oklahoma in the Big
Eight, traditionally a strong football school and conference. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. The NCAA made it clear that the action taken would not only apply to the
offending school's football program, but to other sports programs within the school as well.
109. See supra note 83.
110. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101. The Court pointed out that there exist cases
where joint agreements actually increase output and enhance competition. Id. at 103. See
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). In other words, limited restraints and
regulations promulgated by the NCAA could and do enhance competition among its mem-
ber institutions, and the sports in which they participate. This appears to be endemic in
professional sport leagues. See R. BORK, THE ANTrTRUST PARADox 278-279 (1978) (where
Bork concludes that many activities in league sports can only be carried out jointly. There-
fore, "horizontal merger limitations" placed upon the leagues are inappropriate).
111. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 103.
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plied the modified Rule of Reason analysis, " 2 placing the burden
of justifying the anti-competitive television policy on the NCAA; a
burden too heavy for the NCAA to prove. " It was against this
legal background that both Judge Will and Judge Easterbrook
operated. "
Judge Easterbrook and the Seventh Circuit, after completing
its own antitrust analysis (substantially the same as the lower
court's reasoning, but using different terminology) affirmed the
District Court's antitrust analysis as not clearly erroneous.11 5 The
only argument that Judge Easterbrook felt deserved closer atten-
tion was the NBA's contention that the twenty game rule helped
control free-riding. The concept of free-riding is "the diversion of
value from a business rival's efforts without payment."1 6 Restric-
tions, such as the proposed five game reduction, if properly justi-
fied, could be used by the NBA to protect the league from free-
riders who destroy any incentives for the league to promote its
product.'1 7 Control of free-riding is therefore a good argument to
exempt oneself from antitrust scrutiny. 18
The NBA argued that the Bulls and WGN were free-riding off
the league's commercial product. Most importantly, the Bulls and
WGN were benefitting from NBA advertisements that NBC and
TNT were contractually required to run during other broadcasts,
without paying for this benefit.119 The Court responded, however,
112. See supra note 86.
113. The NCAA could not demonstrate that its television policy served any legitimate
pro-competitive purpose. As it proved to be unreasonable, the plan was condemned. Id. at
113.
114. See supra text accompanying note 83 and infra text accompanying notes 124-125.
115. Chicago Pro. Sports II, 961 F.2d at 672-674.
116. Id. at 674. A simplified example is as follows: "A" manufactures a product which
requires an explanation or demonstration to show its superiority over similar products. "B",
a retailer, displays the product in his showroom to exhibit its superiority over the competi-
tion. The demonstration costs "B" extra money in labor and space. As "B" may not charge
his customers for this added service, the cost is made up in the purchase price. Realistically,
however, a customer may leave the store with knowledge of the product's superiority and
purchase it at "C's" store for a lesser price due to the fact that "C" does not offer the
demonstration. See Id. at 674-76 for a more detailed discussion on free-riding. See also
Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturer's Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86 (1960)
[hereinafter Telser, Fair Trade].
Thus, "retailers who do not provide the special services get a free ride at the expense of
those who have convince consumers to buy the product." Telser, Fair Trade at 91.
117. See Ernest Gellhorn and Teresa Tatham, Making Sense Out of the Rule of Rea-
son, 35 CASE W. REs. REv. 155 (1985).
118. See Continental T.N., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S 36, 54-56 (1977) (hold-
ing that free-rider and related economic effects justified the abandonment of the per se rule
against vertical territorial restrictions).
119. Chicago Pro. Sports II, 961 F.2d at 675.
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that as long as payment for this benefit was possible (i.e. nothing
precluded the NBA from charging a fee for the benefit) free-riding
could not be a defense:
[The NBA] may... charge members for values delivered. As the
NBA itself emphasizes, there are substantial revenue transfers,
propping up the weaker clubs in order to promote vigorous com-
petition on the Court. Without skipping a beat the NBA may
change these payments to charge for the Bulls' ride. If the $40
million of advertising time that NBC will provide during the
four years of its current contract also promotes WGN's games,
then the league may levy a charge for each game shown on a
superstation, or require the club to surrender a portion of its
revenues. 
120
Put simply, because the NBA had, and still has, the right to levy a
fee on superstation broadcasts, as is done by Major League Base-
ball, 2 ' there was no free-riding that justified the restriction. 122 The
NBA, however, would take advantage of Easterbrook's advice, and
adopt a program in the new national contract, charging the teams
(in what has widely been characterized as exorbitant) fees for the
right to broadcast NBA games on superstations.123
In concluding its substantive analysis, the Seventh Circuit
pointed to the futility of the NBA's case. The arguments were no
different than the arguments rejected in Board of Regents."" Until
the Supreme Court was willing to modify Board of Regents, or the
NBA was prepared to present credible evidence that superstations
unfairly affect both local and national television ratings, the Sev-
enth Circuit was not prepared to reverse the lower court's findings
as clearly erroneous. 2 " The NBA could not satisfy its burden
120. Id.
121. Baseball has also attempted to limit superstation broadcasts. See infra text ac-
companying notes 160-173.
122. Chicago Pro. Sports II, 961 F.2d at 675. Judge Easterbrook did sympathize with
the NBA's plight and apparently warned the Bulls and WGN not to ask the District Court
to ban all revenue sharing procedures for telecasting:
[W]e do not suppose that the Bulls are going to ask the court to hold that the
draft of college players, the cap on their payroll, the distribution of revenues
from the NBC and TNT contracts, and other sharing devices all violate the
Sherman Act. Sharing is endemic in league sports. The prevalence of what is
otherwise a hallmark of a cartel may suggest the shakiness of treating the clubs,
which must cooperate to have any product to sell, as "rival producers" in the
first place.
Id. at 676.
123. See infra text accompanying notes 138-151.
124. Chicago Pro. Sports II, 961 F.2d at 676-77.
125. Id.
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under the modified version of the Rule of Reason. The Supreme
Court of the United States denied certiorari.126
VI. ANALYSIS OF THE COURTS' DECISIONS
The fan's desire for maximized television output of NBA
games endured the battle in the court system. However, both
courts made it clear that if the NBA had presented evidence that
superstations harm the local markets, the five game reduction
might have survived antitrust scrutiny. The courts even exhibited
some apprehension towards superstations. At one point in his deci-
sion, Judge Will stated that he sympathized with the NBA's con-
cern that "superstations buy on the cheap the same product that
the national networks pay millions for. .. ,"127 In concluding the
opinion, the District Court invited Congress to modernize the
copyright laws and the Sports Broadcasting Act to deal more equi-
tably with the problem. 28
The Seventh Circuit stated that it would not have been ad-
verse to issuing a preliminary, rather a final, injunctive order as
the District Court had done. 29 According to Judge Easterbrook, it
might have been more reasonable to tolerate a harmful practice for
a while, than to condemn what may turn out to be a beneficial
.practice, given more time. "
However, because the NBA presented no evidence of harm to
the local markets at trial, it was virtually impossible to show that
the benefits of the twenty game rule in the local market out-
weighed the burdens to the consumers and national market in gen-
eral; hence the Courts condemned the rule under an antitrust anal-
ysis. But imagine the effect of this decision on smaller markets in
the NBA with weaker teams. The judgment says that, although the
small market owns the exclusive rights to broadcast its home
team's games, the current statutory scheme condones the invasion
of superstations into the local market to either broadcast a differ-
ent game, or even the same game. 31
126. 113 S.Ct. 409 (1992).
127. Chicago Pro. Sports, 754 F. Supp. at 1359.
128. The court found little distinction between what the SBA called sponsored televi-
sion and pay television as advertising on both types of broadcasts had become increasingly
commercial and competitive. Id. at 1364. Further, § 111 of the Copyright Act of 1976 was
born in an era before the creation of superstations. Id. See supra note 79.
129. See Chicago Pro. Sports II, 961 F.2d at 676.
130. Id.
131. But see 47 C.F.R. § 76.67 (1992) (noting that no systems may import a live game
into the market where the game is being played if that sporting event is not otherwise avail-
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VII. THE LOCAL MARKET EFFECT
The effect of superstations' intrusions can be devastating on
local markets. Take, for instance, WBFS-TV, channel 33 in Miami,
Florida. WBFS bought the exclusive over-the-air rights to broad-
cast both Miami Heat basketball games and Florida Marlins base-
ball games. When the Heat plays the Atlanta Hawks in Atlanta,
there is a good chance that channel 33 will be carrying the game.
But, in addition to channel 33's broadcast, WTBS in Atlanta may
carry the game and be picked up by cable in the Miami area as
well. According to WBFS-TV's Program Director and Executive
Producer of Sports, Stan Wasilik, this result may be great for the
sports fan, but this type of duplication hurts the station's ratings,
which in turn affects the price WBFS can charge for advertising.132
Even on nights where WBFS broadcasts games not in direct com-
petition with games on WTBS or WGN, Wasilik suspects the sta-
tion's ratings go down, even though he says there is no way to
quantify this.133
A recent survey by A.C. Nielsen studying the superstation
controversy does quantify the effect. On a survey for KPLR TV,
which broadcasts St. Louis Cardinals baseball games, the study
showed that viewership dropped thirty percent on nights WGN
broadcast baseball games and up to twenty percent on nights
games were shown on WTBS. T5 ESPN found that their ratings
were up to sixty-nine percent higher for baseball games on nights
when they did not have to compete with superstations'13 Further-
more, the Kansas City Royals, who used to broadcast their base-
ball games in smaller markets such as KRJH-TV in Tulsa, now
only show five games per season there, because of the impact that
superstations have on the local market. 36 David Alworth, Major
League Baseball's Executive Director of Broadcasting, stated that,
"[l]ocal television distributors feel the superstations have so di-
able in the form of a live television broadcast by the local market station).
132. Interview with Stan Wasilik, Program Director and Executive Producer of Sports
of WBFS-TV, in Miami, Fla. (Feb. 2, 1993). Wasilik added that the superstations' impact on
local ratings cannot be quantified.
133. Id.
134. Richard Sandomir, Just How Super Are These Stations, N.Y. TimEs, Sept. 1,
1992, at B13. One could argue that the reason ratings have dropped so much in baseball is
because the season and games are longer than the basketball season and games. Compared
to baseball's 162 game schedule, basketball's quicker pace and 82 game schedule leaves less
likelihood for burn-out of the average sports fan.
135. Id.
136. See David Alworth, Superstations Cater to Select Teams' Fans, Ignore Local
Favorites, USA TODAY, June 30, 1992, at 10C.
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luted the market that it doesn't make economic sense for them to
televise more local games."3 The evidence clearly shows that
superstations hurt both local and national broadcasts, but the
court system was powerless to intervene because of the NBA's fail-
ure to present any credible evidence.
VIII. THE NEW NBA CONTRACT
In May of 1993, after exhausting its legal resources in court,
the NBA announced an unprecedented new national television
contract effective for the 1994-95 season through the 1997-98 sea-
son. The contract's stated goal is to improve the league's national
television ratings. At the same time, however, the contract aims to
end the superstations' reign in sports."'8 The new four year $750
million dollar contract with NBC has the potential of abolishing
superstation coverage of NBA games."3 9 However, all the league es-
sentially has done is take the advice of Judge Easterbrook" 0 and
transferred all the "broadcast and cable rights to all of the league's
teams to NBC.' 4' The contract further provides that NBC will
then revert the right to "negotiate cable rights to all the league's
teams back to the NBA," allowing the NBA to control the national
cable rights.142
The NBA believes that the new contract follows the narrow
requirements of the Sports Broadcasting Act (SBA)," because,
not only are all the broadcast rights to all the games now trans-
ferred to NBC, but it is NBC, and not the league, which seeks the
ban on superstation broadcasts.' 4 4 Furthermore, according to the
NBA, the league is simply following the NFL's model under the
SBA, the model the SBA has allowed for over thirty years to es-
cape antitrust examination." Because NBC holds the rights to all
137. Id.
138. See Gene Kimmelman, TV Sports: Fans Lose, Cartel Wins, USA TODAY, May 13,
1993, at 15A. Baseball also announced a new national television contract in May with simi-
lar goals. Although baseball's contract does not directly refer to the demise of the supersta-
tions, the contract has the effect of "blacking out local broadcasts, including WTBS, WGN
and WWOR, as part of [the] national television deal," thereby effectively "eliminat[ing]
competition for its national telecasts .. .driv[ing] up advertising rates." Id.
139. See Thomas Tyrer, NBA, NBC Deal Limits Cable Games, ELECTRONIC MEDIA,
May 10, 1993, at 3 [hereinafter Tyrer, Cable Games].
140. See supra text accompanying note 79-80.
141. Tyrer, Cable Games, supra note 139 at 3.
142. Id.
143. See supra section "Sports Broadcasting Act" accompanying notes 60-80.
144. See Doug Mittler, Superstations Lose in NBA's TV Deal, WAsH. TtmEs, May 8,
1993, at D6 [hereinafter Mittler, Superstations Lose].
145. See Steve Nadetz, Cable Rights Spur Renewal of NBA-WGN Battle, Cm. TRm.,
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of the NBA games, the network essentially has the ability to veto
any broadcast, including superstation broadcasts.
14 6
Only after the NBA negotiates the national cable deal with
TNT may the remaining games be purchased by the supersta-
tions.'"7 Moreover, whereas before the superstations paid little for
the rights to show basketball games, superstation games will now
reportedly cost the Bulls and Hawks $250,000 for each game the
teams authorize the stations to show. 4 The teams, however, will
still enjoy the rights to negotiate their own local broadcast and
cable deals with one major limitation: all contracts will be subject
to the approval of the NBA and NBC.14 9
Judge Will said he would rule on the legality of the new con-
tract in October of 1993, after a trial was held on the issue of
WGN's right to broadcast up to as many as forty-one Bulls games
nationally.' 50 Even if Judge Will finds the new contract illegal, the
superstations still have to worry about the broadcasting fee that
the NBA has said it will institute, regardless of the outcome of the
pending litigation.15'
Interpreting the language of the SBA as the Seventh Circuit
did, 51 it appears as if the NBA has followed the formalities of the
Act. According to Judge Easterbrook, the SBA only applies when
the "league has 'transferred' a right to 'sponsored telecasting'" to
the networks. 5 ' Disregarding the debate on what constitutes
May 10, 1993, at C13 [hereinafter Nadetz, NBA-WGN Battle].
146. Id.
147. See Tyrer, Cable Games, supra note 139 at 3.
148. See Nadetz, NBA-WGN Battle, supra note 145 at C13. Attorneys for WGN be-
lieve that the fee is so high that it will prevent WGN from broadcasting basketball games
nationally. Id.
According to WGN attorney Chuck Sennet:
They're [NBA] trying to fit this square peg into the round hole of the [S]ports
[B]roadcasting [A]ct. The NBA isn't taking these games for the purpose of
broadcasting them [on NBC]. There are 1,107 games per season. NBC's going to
televise 26 of those. They're just sort of filtering the broadcast rights up through
the NBA and up through the network. And then they go back down to the
league, which then gives them back to the teams - minus the superstations. It's a
Rube Goldberg device to screen out the superstations.
Id.
149. Id.
150. See Nidetz, CBS' Surprise, supra note 145 at C13. The case has now run over
into 1994. As of publication of this article in the spring of 1994, no decision had been ren-
dered on the legality of the new contract.
151. See Terry Blount, NBA Wins Latest Battle in the Superstation War, Hous.
CHRON., May 9, 1993, at Sports 2, 24.
152. See supra text accompanying note 79.
153. Chicago Pro. Sports II, 961 F.2d at 671.
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"sponsored telecasting,"15 the NBA has accomplished in 1993 ex-
actly what the Seventh Circuit ruled that the NBA failed to do in
1991 when it passed the twenty game rule. 55
Whether or not the contract is ultimately held to be legal, the
NBA has learned from its mistakes in court. With the new con-
tract, the NBA's posture is that if it can not achieve to a lesser
degree what the now defunct twenty game rule attempted to
achieve, then the league can go to the extreme and simply cut out
superstation broadcasts completely. And if the NBA's twenty game
rule can not be justified under the theory of free-riding, then the
league will heed the advice of Judge Easterbrook and follow Major
League Baseball's path by charging the superstations for the right
to broadcast an NBA game.' 56
The new contract alleviates the problem that local sports mar-
kets have experienced in the past in regard to superstations. No
longer will these markets have to compete directly with WGN or
WTBS. However, what a small populace and some local stations
will gain is at the expense of the rest of the nation who will lose
nightly national coverage of basketball games.
The underlying tension between the local markets' bid for ex-
clusivity and the sports fan's desire for as much sports coverage as
possible remains; only now, it appears as if the local market will
prosper at the expense of the sports fan. Basketball fans, used to
nightly NBA exposure, will fear this result. If the new contract is
as foolproof as the NBA believes, then the court system will be
powerless to intervene. To go from one extreme of an unprotected
local market to the other extreme of a nationwide drastic reduction
in output is unacceptable.
IX. ADDRESSING THE SUPERSTATION CONTROVERSY
Assuming that Judge Will finds that the new NBA contract
follows the requirements of the SBA, sport fans will be denied the
nightly NBA entertainment they have become accustomed to
watching. On the other hand, the NBA will have succeeded in pro-
tecting and controlling its national television market with both
154. See supra note 79.
155. According to the Seventh Circuit, "As the 'league of clubs' has not transferred to
the networks either the right to show, or the right to black out, any additional games, the
Sports Broadcasting Act does not protect its 20-game rule." Chicago Pro. Sports 11, 961
F.2d at 671. With the new contract, there not only has been a transfer by a league a net-
work, but NBC now has the right to black out superstation broadcasts. See Mittler, Super-
stations Lose, supra note 144 at D6.
156. See supra text accompanying note 121.
[Vol. 11:173
24
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 9
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol11/iss1/9
NBA SUPERSTATION CONTROVERSY
NBC and TNT. But if the NBA was concerned with protecting its
teams' local markets, there were, and still are, less drastic means in
achieving this end, allowing both the local markets broadcast ex-
clusivity and the sport's fan maximum output.
A. The Sports Broadcasting Act
Modernizing the SBA, to allow the NBA to legally place out-
put restrictions upon superstation telecasts of NBA games does
not cure the problem.' 57 True, there would be less saturation from
superstation broadcasts, but this does not necessarily mean that
local markets will directly benefit. Limiting superstation broad-
casts offers the NBA a better opportunity to increase the number
of games shown nationally. 158 Local markets may benefit some, but
more national games mean less games shown locally, as local mar-
kets are prohibited from broadcasting their own games during na-
tional NBA telecasts on NBC. '59 This, compounded with local mar-
kets still having to compete with superstations on the nights
superstations retain the right to broadcast NBA games, makes any
change in the SBA less significant. There is a viable alternative to
this problem, but only with Congress' intervention will a middle
ground be reached.
B. Congressional Action and the Fay Vincent Hearings'"
In 1992, while Congress was in the process of considering a
new cable bill (which subsequently was passed) and new copyright
legislation (which did not pass), Major League Baseball (MLB),
through its former Commissioner, Fay Vincent, testified before a
Senate Commerce Subcommittee in support of changes to the
copyright law in the form of an amendment to limit the effect of
the compulsory license.'"' Baseball's original position was to limit
157. This could be achieved, for example, by providing for limited transfers to the
networks to blackout a certain number of games on superstations, or by allowing NBC an
option to show up to a certain number of games per season in addition to the games already
contracted for, thereby blacking-out those available dates from superstation broadcasts.
158. The main reason for the new contract and restricting the number of superstation
broadcasts in the first place was to increase the NBA's national ratings and revenues. This,
in turn, would mean more money for teams.
159. See supra text accompanying note 53. The other side to this argument is that
there are over 1,000 NBA games per season. NBC is going to show so few of these games
that local telecasters should not be affected. Even if some markets will be affected, since
NBA schedules are made in advance, the league, networks and local stations should be able
to work around each other. Telephone Interview with Phil Hochberg (July 23, 1993).
160. Major League Baseball's former Commissioner.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 23-29. According to Executive Director of
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"distant signal importation of major league games generally." '
When it appeared that Baseball's plan was unpopular with not
only Congress, but fans as well, MLB fell back on its second posi-
tion-disallowing the importation of a superstation game into a lo-
cal market, if that local market had the exclusive right to broad-
cast the same game. 68
The former 16 ' Baseball Commissioner told the Senate subcom-
mittee that superstations dilute both the local and national televi-
sion markets by severely limiting the "broad range of baseball pro-
gramming that could be offered to consumers nationwide."'15 The
amendment that Major League Baseball proposed read:
Provided, however, that no cable operator shall retransmit the
signal of a superstation while that superstation is broadcasting a
game of a professional sports league if a live telecast of that
game is otherwise available for reception by the subscribers to
such cable system, except this provision shall not apply when
such a game is only available on a pay-per-view basis.'66
The amendment would not have blacked out any games, but sim-
ply would have ended superstation duplication of the same game
in the local market, thereby ensuring the exclusivity of the local
market broadcast. 67
There were many in the television industry who believed that
Vincent was merely attempting to exhibit the attributes of his pay-
per-view television plan, despite language in the amendment to the
contrary. 68 Pay-per-view critics argued that the amendment really
Broadcasting for Major League Baseball, David Alworth, "The NBA approach in limiting
games was an approach we shied away from simply because we thought it might be chal-
lenged as an antitrust violation." Rich Brown, High Court Rules for WGN in NBA Case,
BROADCASTING, Nov. 9, 1992, at 54.
162. Telephone interview with Phil Hochberg, Washington-based attorney for the
NBA and NHL (June 30, 1993)[hereinafter Hochberg]. The original position would limit
superstation broadcasts to their own local cable markets. Id.
163. Id. This situation would occur, for instance, when the Chicago Cubs were playing
the Florida Marlins and both Channel 33 in Miami and WGN were showing the game.
WGN's signal would not be seen in the areas where Channel 33 purchased the exclusive
rights to broadcast Marlins games. However, the game would otherwise be available
nationally.
164. One of the leaders of the group who forced Vincent to resign is the Tribune Com-
pany, the owner of the Cubs who also happens to own WGN. See Jack Craig, Battle Sta-
tions For Superstations, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 9, 1992, at 82.
165. Dart, Vincent, supra note 43 at F5.
166. Details of the Proposed Baseball Amendment to Pending Cable T.V. Legislation
from the Office of the Commissioner of Major League Baseball, New York, N.Y. (Aug. 6,
1992) (on file with author).
167. Id.
168. See e.g. Jerome Holtzman, Vincent Tries a Little Tenderness, Seeks Middle
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aimed to limit superstation telecasts to only their local markets
(e.g., WGN would only be seen in the Chicago area), so that the
sports leagues could then sell certain select games to the cable
companies or networks on a pay-per-view basis.' 10
Consumer advocates joined the fight against Vincent and base-
ball. Gene Kimmelman, legislative director of the Consumer Feder-
ation of America,17 0 and Professor Stephen Ross17 1 warned that ab-
sent superstations, many fans who live in areas without major
league teams would have to resort to pay-per-view to watch their
favorite sports teams.1' For example, superstations allow baseball
and basketball fans in Fargo, North Dakota, a town without any
major league sporting teams, to enjoy nightly professional sports
entertainment. Without the luxury of superstations, these fans
would either have to wait for a weekend network game or purchase
the right to watch a game on pay-per-view. With this black cloud
hanging over MLB's head, the superstation lobbyists and con-
sumer advocates were more influential than Major League Base-
ball, and when Vincent resigned as Commissioner, "the amend-
ment went south. ' '173
Complying with the terms of the proposed amendment would
not have been overly burdensome. Local stations owning the exclu-
sive contracts with sports teams only had to inform the local cable
companies to blackout the superstation broadcast of the same
sporting event in the affected area;174 something the stations and
cable companies do everyday in order to comply with Syndex.'1 s
This way, local broadcasters could ensure the exclusivity of their
baseball and basketball contracts, while the rest of the nation, es-
pecially smaller areas without professional sports teams, would en-
joy nightly sports entertainment.
Ground To Defuse Superstation Dilemma, CHi. TuRn., June 21, 1992, at C5. According to
Phil Hochberg, this criticism was really in response to MLB's original position of simply
ending superstation broadcasts altogether. See Hochberg, supra note 162.
169. See Dart, Vincent, supra note 43 at F5. The NCAA has already begun experi-
menting with pay-per-view.
170. The Consumer Federation of America is a non-profit corporation which seeks to
represent the viewpoints and interests of consumers before Congress, regulatory agencies
and the courts.
171. See supra note 79.
172. Dart, supra note 43, at F5.
173. Telephone Interview with Phil Hochberg, Washington based attorney for the
NBA and NHL (Apr. 7, 1993). One could speculate that if MLB had started with its fall-
back position, criticism might have been less and the amendment could of had a better
chance of passing through Committee.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 37-41.
175. See id.
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X. CONCLUSION
The NBA has been forced to go to extremes with its new con-
tract. Justifiably or not, if the contract is found to fit within the
narrow requirements of the SBA, it will be ruled legal. However,
from a policy standpoint, the superstation controversy still exists,
only now adversely affecting the sports fan to the point that pay-
per-critics and consumer groups are up in arms. It may be time for
Congress to step in and take some kind of control. Former Baseball
Commissioner Fay Vincent's fall-back position, in the form of a
proposed amendment to the compulsory license under the Copy-
right Act, is by far the most equitable solution to the superstation
dilemma. With this middle ground, no one is deprived of anything.
Local markets can exclusively broadcast in their areas the games
for which they paid for the rights to show. Cable subscribers
around the country would not be deprived of any televised super-
station games, unless these games conflict with that particular
market's broadcast rights. If this occurs, the game is simply shown
on a different channel.
. Even the NBA, which way back in the District Court claimed
it instituted the original five game reduction partly for the protec-
tion of the local markets, can feel some satisfaction. Although the
league is really concerned with its national ratings and advertising
revenues, output of NBA games would remain high and it would be
Congress' first major step in regulating the superstations, which
have basically enjoyed carte blanche in television industry since
shortly after the Copyright Act of 1976 was enacted. If still worried
about league revenues, the NBA always has the option of adopting
MLB's charging system for every superstation game shown; some-
thing the NBA has already threatened to do.
With any notions of pay-per-view aside, it is hard to imagine
how anyone, even a consumer advocate, could argue against ending
needless duplication in local markets that end up damaging adver-
tising for local broadcasters. Arguments by sport fans that they
should be able to have the freedom to select which version of the
basketball game to watch (i.e. a selection between the play-by-play
announcer they want to hear) is economically unsound. 17' This
type of argument leads to less local team games in the local
176. It is not persuasive that basic cable costs a fee to watch and if one pays for it, one
should have a choice. The imbalance between the unfair economics that is occurring here
and viewers freedom of choice argument is so immense, it is hard to take it seriously. It is
difficult to see how Congress could have taken it so seriously in the Fay Vincent hearings.
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market.177
Unfortunately, the game we used to watch is no longer a game,
but a multi-million dollar enterprise. With the passage of the new
basketball contract, and the NBA's desire to boost its national tel-
evision ratings and advertising rates, local broadcasters are now
limited to the games the league and networks allow the locals to
telecast. An amendment to § 111 of the Copyright Act, impacting
the effect of the compulsory license, would simply restore the fair
market value to local telecast rights and eliminate the below mar-
ket, unnecessary, redundant broadcasts of sporting events in a lo-
cal cable area. It is a fair business practice and gives back to local
sporting broadcasts some of what they lost when the superstations
came to town.
Jason S. Oletsky*
177. See supra text accompanying note 137. The worst case scenario, of course, is that
the local market will cease to broadcast all home team games, and the viewer will have to
settle for watching somebody else's local favorite on the superstations.
* J.D., 1994, University of Miami School of Law. The author would like to thank Pro-
fessor Marc Fajer of the University of Miami School of Law and Philip R. Hochberg of
Baroff, Koerner, Olender & Hochberg, P.C. in Washington, D.C. for all of their help in writ-
ing this Article.
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